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ABSTRACT
The relative fire hazards of Jet A and Jet B aircraft fuels are
evaluated. The evaluation is based on a consideration of the presence of
and/or the generation of flammable mixtures in fuel systems, the ignition
characteristics, and the'flame propagation rates for the two fuel types.
Three distinct aircraft operating regimes vhere fuel type may be a factor
in fire hazards are considered. These are (l) ground handling and refuel-
ing, (2) flight, and (3) crash. The evaluation indicates that the overall
fire hazards for Jet A are less than for Jet B fuel.
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AN EVALUATION OF THE RELATIVE FIRE
HAZARDS OF JET A AND JET B FOR COMMERCIAL FLIGHT
"by Robert R. Hibbard and Paul T. Hacker
Lewis Research Center
SUMMARY
The relative fire hazards of Jet A and Jet B aircraft fuels are
evaluated. The evaluation is based on a consideration of the presence
of and/or the generation of flammable mixtures in fuel systems, the
ignition characteristics, and the flame propagation rates for the two
fuel types. Three distinct aircraft operating regimes where fuel type
may be a factor in fire hazards are considered. These are (l) ground
handling and refueling, (2) flight, and (3) crash. The evaluation indi-
cates that the overall fire hazards for Jet A are less than for Jet B
fuel.
INTRODUCTION
The question is raised periodically as to whether there is any sig-
o\ nificant difference in the fire hazards between the kerosene type Jet A
V^- and the more volatile Jet B when used as fuels for gas turbine powered
pq aircraft. There has been little commercial usage of Jet B in recent years
but the present energy crisis and the reduced availability of petroleum
products may put one or the other of these two fuels in short supply.
Therefore, economic pressures may re-open the question as to the relative
fire hazards of these fuels.
The kerosene types are the commercial Jet A and Jet A-l (these dif-
fer only in freezing point) fuels and the military JP-8 and JP-5 fuels.
JP-8 is identical with Jet A-l and JP-5 is slightly less volatile than
either but is still classed as a kerosene type fuel. The more volatile
jet fuels now in use are the commercial Jet B and the military JP-U; Jet B
and JP-h have identical specifications insofar as they relate to fire
hazards. There are also the Air Force JP-6 and JP-T fuels, both interme-
diate in volatility between the JP-U and kerosene types, but these are
special application fuels in limited use and will not be discussed further.
With the exception of extreme altitude flame out and relight charac-
teristics where the more volatile fuels are slightly superior, all of the
above fuels perform equally,.well in modern jet engines. Commercial oper-
ations are at lower altitudes than military so that performance at extreme
altitudes is not a factor. The choice between .fuels is then based only
on their cost and on safety and possibly on availability in times of fuel
shortages. The relative costs of Jet A and Jet B vary with time and place
and are not considered herein. The safety aspect is the subject of this
report.
The relative safety between these two classes of fuels has "been re-
viewed several times, most thoroughly by the Coordinating Research Council
(CRC) for commercial fuels in 196^  (ref. l), by the U.S. Air Force Aero
Propulsion Laboratory for military fuels in 1966 (ref. 2), and by the Air
Safety Group for commercial fuels in 196? (ref. 3). Two divergent conclu-
sions were reached. The Air Force report (ref. 2) concluded that "...utili-
zation of a lower volatility fuel such as JP-5 would contribute little, if
any, improvement in the current Air Force safety record." The CRC had a
somewhat less specific conclusion (ref. l) that.";..adoption of a single
type of aviation turbine fuel...would not significantly improve the over-
all excellent safety record of commercial aviation." This statement im-
plies, but does not directly state, ,that .the .more volatile Jet .B is no
more hazardous than Jet A. The rationale behind this statement is that
Jet B was little used and, therefore, the change from a small usage of
Jet B to zero usage would not improve safety. The Air Safety Group report
(ref. 3) is admittedly "...not a technical treatise..." but used much of
the CRC report data to arrive at a quite different conclusion. This re-
port concluded that "...the fire and death rate with kerosene (Jet A) is
at present but a small fraction of that with JP-k (Jet B)" and that
"...if JP-U should gain wide acceptance, the fire and death rate for tur-
bine powered aircraft could be expected at least.to equal, and probably
much exceed that for piston engine aircraft" and.that."...kerosene fueled
transport has halved at least'the piston engine fire death'rate'.''.
^ These divergent conclusions result, in part, from the weak statistical
base against which relative fuel hazards can be compared. Air Force oper-
ations have been almost entirely with JP-U and an earlier use of the even
more volatile JP-3, Naval operations with the very low volatility JP-5,
and commercial operations largely with Jet A. Each of these groups uses
predominantly or exclusively a different type fuel and each flies a dif-
ferent type of operation. Therefore, accident statistics which might be
fuel related cannot be compared between groups with confidence. The Air
Safety Group (ref. 3) put considerable.weight-in a comparison of the acci-
dent statistics of kerosene fueled turbine.powered aircraft and gasoline
fueled piston engine powered craft. The implication here is that experi-
ence with the volatile gasoline in piston powered aircraft may be indica-
tive of what could be expected.if turbine .powered commercial aircraft had
used the more volatile Jet B. However, there are such great differences
between piston and jet aircraft in airframe size and configuration, in
engine related ignition sources, and in flight operations that such compari-
sons are of doubtful value. Both the CRC (ref. l) and the Air Force (ref. 2)
have relied more on comparisons between the combustion.qualities of the
fuels as measured.in bench scale experiments, that is, the conditions that
yield flammable mixtures, the ignition requirements, and the flame propa-
gation rates.
This report .is an evaluation of the relative.fire.hazards associated
with Jet A and Jet B fuels. Much of the supporting data.are the same
as that used in references 1 and 2. While there.has been ongoing research
since these reports were published, most of the newer.results only confirm
or but slightly modify earlier understandings. Therefore, the present
report is not based primarily on new data but is rather a re-evaluation of
combustion phenomena as they relate to fire hazards in commercial turbojet
operations.
ANALYSIS
There are three separate and distinct aircraft operating regimes
where fuel type may be a factor in fire .hazards. These are (l) ground
handling and refueling, (2) the conditions encountered in flight, and
(3) those encountered in crashes. Most important of the last are the
survivable crashes where the presence or absence of fire or the intensity
of fire can be a very important factor in the loss of life; these occur
most often during takeoff or landing. Jet A and Jet B are compared herein
as to their fire hazards under each of these regimes. The specifications
for these two fuels and for the several military fuels are listed in the
appendix. Also given are the properties for typical samples of Jet A and
Jet B. There is also a discussion in the appendix of the several combus-
tion related properties that may influence aircraft fire hazards.
We will, for each operating regime, outline the environments that may
be encountered and comment on the relative flammable hazards incurred with
each fuel using information given in the appendix.
Fire Hazards in Ground Handling and Refueling
Fixed tankage and that on mobile refuelers will be considered first„
These tanks may be at near equilibrium conditions with the ullage space
having a fuel vapor - air composition that can be calculated from vapor
pressure - temperature considerations. The probability that this space
will be flammable is then dependent on fuel type and temperature. Tank
pressure should not be a variable since the tanks are usually vented to
ambient and the ambient pressure will be approximately 1 atmosphere at
all but a very few airports.
Some data on fuel temperatures in airport storage is given in refer-
ence 1. This reference included a survey of United States airports that
showed that fuel temperatures exceeded 95° F (35° C) only 1 percent of
the time, were above 60° F (l6° C) 63 percent of the time and above 32° F
(0° C) 95 percent of the time. The same report considered the maximum fuel
temperature that might be encountered on the ground, worldwide, and found
105° F (1*1° C) as the highest reported for 13 airports in hot climates.
Therefore, most stored fuel temperatures are'between 32° F (0° C) and
95° F (35° C) and rarely, if ever, exceed 105° F (Ul° C).
Figure A-2 from the appendix gives, for both sea level and altitude
conditions, the upper and lower temperature limits for flammability for
the typical Jet A and Jet B fuels. Below the lower temperature, the ullage
space will be too lean to burn and above the upper temperature it will be
too rich, under equilibrium conditions. The figure shows that at sea level
the ullage of Jet A will not be flammable at temperatures below 125° F
(52° C) "but that the ullage of Jet B will be flammable at fuel temperatures
between -15° F (-26° C) and 55° F (13° C). From these limiting temperatures
and the probable fuel temperatures given in the preceding paragraph, we
can conclude that Jet A will never yield a flammable vapor-air mixture
under ground handling conditions but that there will be an explosive haz-
ard with Jet B about 30 percent of the time at U.S. airports.. The rest
of the time the Jet B tankage'temperature will be above. 55° F (130°' C.) and,
therefore, too rich to burn. All this is under equilibrium conditions
where the ullage space is fully saturated as to fuel vapor.
The flammable range can, under nonequilibrium conditions, be extended
beyond the temperatures listed above. A finite period is required to
attain equilibrium after any disturbance to a closed system because it
takes time for fuel to vaporize or condense, for fuel vapors to mix through-
out an ullage space so that the same concentrations are found everywhere,
and for suspended mists and foams to settle back into the bulk liquid.
Therefore, the flammable range of temperatures can be extended for some
period of time through the inbreathing of air through tank vents, through
the stratification of fuel vapors immediately after a fill, and during the
period when mists and foams are settling back after having been formed by
the mechanical action of filling or acceleration in mobile fuel systems.
The length of time that nonequilibrium exists varies with the disturbance.
Mists and foams can extend the lean flammable limits to temperatures
lower than those at equilibrium as shown in figure A-3. This is signifi-
cant only for Jet A since the effect is to render a tank hazardous at
temperatures lower than the normal lean limit'of 125° F (52° C); a hazard
thereby exists under normal ambient conditions whereas there is none at
equilibrium. The same misting effect would also extend the lean limit of
Jet B to lower temperatures but this temperature is already down to -15° F
(-26° C) so that this effect is mainly of academic interest. However,
this nonequilibrium transient is fairly short lived. Mists with droplets
smaller than 10 microns (ym) in diameter are very hard to form through
mechanical action and the settling rate of 10 micron drops is about
0.01 foot (0.003 m) per second. Therefore, a 5-minute settling time would
completely clear a 3-foot (l-m) deep ullage space and a 20-foot (6-m)
ullage would be free of suspended drops in about 1 hour. Under most con-
ditions, such as fuel splashing during fill, the bulk of the droplets are
much larger than 10 microns and would settle out in much shorter times.
In any case, splashing can be avoided by undersurface discharge during
tank filling.
In summary, misting effects can extend the flammable regime of Jet A
to below 125° F (52° C) but in practice this nonequilibrium effect is
short lived and adds very little to the flammable hazards incurred in the
ground handling of this fuel. Jet A tankage remains safe at normal ambient
temperatures most of the time.
Wonequilibrium due to tank inbreathing and stratification is more pre-
valent and persists for much longer times. We. have no data on fuel storage
tanks but reference 7 gives both an analysis and experimental data on a
smaller (225 gal) tank that shows the magnitude of the.problem. In their
case, a rectangular tank 3 feet by 3 feet by '3 -feet h inches deep (0.9- by
0.9- by 1.0-m) was 80 percent filled with JP-h (Jet B) and fuel withdrawn
from the bottom at 0.5 gallon (0.0019 m3) per minute. -The tank emptied
in 6 hours at this rate. Air entered at the top of the tank during this
time and the degree of stratification, ranging .from-.an equilibrium fuel
concentration at the liquid surface to pure air right at the vent, was both
calculated and measured. The analysis suggested.that .extreme stratifica-
tion was probable for quite long times and the experiment showed this to
be even more severe than the analysis. For example,.1^- hours after the
fuel withdrawal started the fuel concentration.in the upper 18 inches
(O.U5 m) of the 40-inch (l.O m) deep tank was less than one-half the equi-
librium value.
With a mixing process this slow in.a relatively small tank, the time
to establish equilibrium in a large, .fixed .storage tank, must .be measured
in days. The time for full mixing in.a truck transporter would be short-
ened somewhat by vapor phase mixing induced by fuel sloshing. Nevertheless,
the probability of achieving a measure of safety because Jet B tanks are
equilibrium over-rich at temperatures above 55° F.(13° C) is greatly re-
duced in tankage where there is any filling and withdrawal activity.
It might be argued that-this same process would reduce fuel vapor
concentrations in Jet B tanks, so that the ullage would be too lean to burn.
However, at most operating temperatures the equilibrium mixture contains
sufficient fuel vapor so that the ullage would still be flammable after
considerable dilution. There would still be flammable strata down to a
temperature of -15° F (-26° C) in any case.
In summary relative to .tank storage, the Jet A ullage space is never
flammable except possibly for very brief periods when the tank is being
filled. Even these periods can be avoided by.controlling.rate and fill
geometry. On the other hand, the ullage over Jet '.B. is always flammable
except in tanks with fuel temperatures exceeding 55° F (13° C) and where
there has been no withdrawal of fuel in times of .the order of days.
The tanks of aircraft on the ground before, during, .or after refueling
present conditions that are often similar to those encountered in the ground
storage tanks. However, fuel temperatures may be somewhat higher or some-
what lower than those of the storage tanks. The unused fuel remaining in
the tanks at landing will usually be at a lower temperature than that on
the ground.and the tank fuel temperature can go well above ambient while
an aircraft is parked in the open on hot days. ...Assuming equilibrium con-
ditions, the lowered temperature should generally increase the flammable
hazard with .Jet B since the fuel temperature is rarely below the -15° F
(-26° C) low temperature limit. At the same time, the increased tempera-
ture is not likely to increase the hazard with Jet A since fuel temperatures
would rarely exceed 125° F (52° C) even in the hottest climates. Therefore
at equilibrium, just as in the ground storage case, Jet B is much more
likely to form flammable mixtures in aircraft fuel tanks than is Jet A
while the craft is on the ground.
Refueling introduces nonequilibrium transients so that flammable mixtures
can again be found, as in the case of ground storage, at fuel temperatures
beyond those that define the equilibrium boundaries. Figures l(a) and (b)
give data on these transients. These figures are-direct copies .of fig-
ures 6(a) and (b) in reference 1 where they were credited to reference lk.
Reference lU was not available and there appears to be some discrepancy
as'to the fuel loading rate since the lower rate with Jet B brought up
the liquid fuel level more rapidly than the higher rate with Jet A; perhaps
different sized tanks were used- Nevertheless figure l(a) shows a tran-
sient flammable zone durin-g Jet B fueling at 70° F (21° C); that is,
above the upper equilibrium temperature of 55° F(l3° C). And figure l(b)
shows a flammable zone with Jet A due to the mist formed by splashing fuel
at 85° F (29° C); that is, below the lower equilibrium flammable limit of
125° F (52° C) for this fuel. These transients are of the same type that
can be encountered in ground handling but should be much shorter lived
in the smaller aircraft tanks. In general, just as in the larger tanks,
the Jet B presents the greater hazard as shown by the greater volume in
which flammable mixtures may transiently occur.
Finally, any consideration of flammable hazards must consider the
ease of ignition along with the probability of having a flammable mixture.
Electrical sparks are the most likely ignition source .within the tank but
flames can also propagate through vents after ignition by external sources.
For spark ignition, figure A-k shows Jet B to be more easily ignited than
Jet A. And as for flame propagation through vents, this is more probable
for Jet B vapors since it is far less likely that Jet A mists would both
fill an ullage space and spill out a vent to supply a path that would .
allow a flash back from an external ignition source. Therefore, the pro-
bability of ignition of a flammable mixture, if present, is less with Jet A
than with Jet B.
In summary, the ground handling and refueling hazards are less with
Jet A than with Jet B, both as to the probability of having flammable mix-
tures and as to the ignition energy requirements.
Fire Hazards in Flight
These hazards are again related to the probability of having a flam-
mable mixture and the possibility of their ignition. Flight introduces
three new variables into the consideration of fire hazards. First, the
pressure is no longer near 1 atmosphere. Second, fuel temperatures can
change more rapidly and the ranges of temperatures encountered are much
wider than in ground handling. And third, there are increased dynamic
factors such as agitation due to turbulence and tank breathing due to
changes in altitude that cause nonequilibrium effects.
Regarding the effect of pressure on flammable limits, figure A-2
shows how the temperature limits go down with increasing altitude. For
example, an equilibrium tank containing Jet A at 100° F (38° C) is not
flammable at sea level but becomes so on rapid climb to 20 000 feet
(6100; m). Similarly a Jet B tank at 20° F (7° C) has a flammable ullage
but this becomes nonflammable under equilibrium conditions at 20 000 feet
(6100 m).
Both of the above examples assume no change in fuel temperature
during climb. However, the ambient air at altitude is usually very much
'colder than that on the ground so that the fuel in the tanks cool with
time in flight. This temperature-time history will vary with aircraft
type, aircraft tank, aircraft flight profile, and air temperatures. Only
a limited amount of fuel temperature data have been recorded in flight
but examples are given in figure 2, reproduced in part from figure 10 of
reference 1. Similar data are given in reference 2 but for greater
extremes in initial fuel temperatures.
The altitude-fuel temperature flammable envelopes from figures A-2
and A-3 along with time-temperature curves of figure 2 then permit esti-
mates to be made of the times during flight that tank ullages would be
flammable. The curves from figure A-2 would be used to estimate this
hazard under equilibrium conditions and those from figure A-3 for nonequili-
brium. Figure 3 shows these results for Jet A and Jet B.
Figure 3(a) shows that the ullage space over typical Jet B will
often be within flammable limits at equilibrium, especially with the
colder fuels. Furthermore, portions of the ullage space will almost always
be flammable at any fuel temperature when the fuel is degassing during
climb or when air is entering the vents to replace fuel consumed or
during descent. The ullage over Jet A is rarely flammable at equilibrium
and then only for a very short time provided the fuel is quite warm
(fig. 3(b)); however, this space can always be rendered flammable if mists
are formed.
The relative flammable hazards of Jet A against Jet B then depend,
in part, on the fraction of flight time that tanks are at or near equili-
brium and the probability that two quite different nonequilibrium processes
take place. Of the latter, the first is the leaning out of over-rich
mixtures with air and the second is the enrichment of too lean mixtures
with mists. At equilibrium, the preference is for Jet A since this fuel
rarely forms a flammable mixture. For the nonequilibrium conditions, the
preference again must be for Jet A. The fuel degassing during climb, the
replacement of fuel with air during cruise, and the inbreathing of air
during descent are conditions that increase hazards only with Jet B and
all of these processes are inevitable. Reference 7 shows that these non-
equilibrium processes do occur and persist even in relatively small tanks;
the larger tanks in aircraft would present greater problems. On the other
hand, the augmented hazard with Jet A due to mist formation is only present
during turbulent flight and the mists would settle out very rapidly.
As for ignition sources in flight, these might be from lightning
strikes, from internal electric shorts, or from hot metal thrown from a
badly failed engine. It is likely that these ignition sources would all
be sufficiently energetic to ignite either fuel. However, if the ignition
energy is borderline, the Jet A again becomes the preferred fuel as shown
in figure A-h. Jet A is also far less-easily ignited by gunfire tharuis
jp-k (Jet B) as shown by the data given in reference 9. However, this
may not be germane to commercial operations.
Finally, there is the question of the damage incurred if the tank
contents do catch fire in flight. Here the advantage is again with Jet A.
Reference 9 reports the results when 10 gallons of fuel were loaded into
a 75-gallon tank and then spark ignited while vigorously shaking the tank.
These results are shown in figure ^ as tank overpressure as a function of
fuel temperature for both fuels. For the temperatures of greatest interest,
below 60° F (l6° C), the pressure generated with JP-8 (Jet A) is very much/
lower than with JP-i (Jet B). Furthermore, and as stated in reference 9
"...flammable mixtures of JP-H are more conducive to involvement of adja-
cent tanks by propagation through vent lines with consequently more destruc-
tive and total damage."
In summary, Jet B presents greater hazards in flight than Jet A in
all respects. Jet B has a greater probability of forming flammable mix-
tures, these mixtures when formed are easier to ignite, and if ignited
the probable extent of damage is greater.
Fire Hazards in Survivable Crashes
Aircraft crashes in which some or all of the passengers and crew may
survive usually occur during takeoff or landing. Conditions in these
crashes are so variable that it is very difficult to make quantitative
statements as to the effect of fuel type on loss of life. Different air-
craft, different crash severities, different degrees of airframe breakup
and fuel spillage, different terrain and different weather all deny the
possibility of a direct comparison among fuels. Therefore, we prefer not
to cite loss of life statistics in the evaluation of relative hazards as
others have done (refs. 1 and 3). Nevertheless, a qualitative comparison
of the fire hazards associated with Jet A and Jet B can be developed based
on the flammable characteristics of these fuels. The factors relevant to
the fire hazards in survivable crashes are:
(1) The probability of forming flammable mixture
(2) The probability of having an ignition source
(3) The probability of the flammable mixture encountering an ignition
source
The time between first flame and the envelopment of the aircraft
(5) The intensity of the fire
These factors will be discussed in turn.
The probability of having a flammable system must be considered to
be near unity in any crash where fuel is spilled. There is no chance of
having a too rich and therefore nonflammable mixture as in the case where
warm Jet B is held in confined space. And even a cold pool of a low vol-
atility fuel like Jet A can be ignited if an energetic ignition source
rests on its surface. Furthermore, the dynamics of.a crash may form mist-
air systems which are highly flammable with either fuel. Therefore, a
potentially flammable situation is always possible whenever fuel is spilled
with the possible exception of a spill .on a foamed runway.
The probability of having an ignition source in a crash is also very
high. There can be electric shorts, friction sparks, and electrostatic
sparks, all with energies very much greater than the minimum ignition
energies of hydrocarbon fuels. Fuels can also be ignited by hot engine
parts, especially those of turbine engines which operate with hot end
metal temperature of from 1000° to 1800° F (538° to 982° C) depending on
engine power. There should be little difference in the ease of ignition
of Jet A and Jet B by the latter: sources (hot metal),since both fuels
have spontaneous ignition temperatures .of only about' ii80° F (2^ 9° C),
well below those found in the engine. But spark ignition energies are
always less for Jet B (see fig. A-U). In general, we believe that there
will be ignition sources capable of igniting either fuel in most severe
but still survivable crashes. However, if there is a preference, this
must be for Jet A since it is somewhat harder to ignite under borderline
conditions.
While Jet A and Jet B differ little in the probability of creating
a potentially flammable situation and also in the probability that a suf-
ficient source for ignition is present, there can be significant differ-
ences between these fuels in the probability that flammable systems will
encounter ignition sources. This factor will depend on the crash environ-
ment. Severe crashes involving tank rupture and strong deceleration forces
can form clouds of fuel mists (ref. 15). These mists are easily ignited
by any of the sources mentioned above. Reference 15 showed that the inges-
tion of mists into a turbine engine that was coasting down in speed after
a crash resulted in ignition and the rapid spread of flames to the outside
of the engine nacelle. There should be little difference between the
hazards, of Jet A and Jet B if fuel mists are formed which envelope the
airframe.
However, there should be significant differences between fuels in the
transport of flammable mixtures to a potential ignition source in milder
crashes where fuel may be spilled but not atomized. At any temperature
above about -15° F (-26° C) the vapor pressure of Jet B is sufficient to
form flammable vapor-air mixtures at the surface of spilled fuel. These
vapors can be carried downwind and possibly to an ignition source. The
vapors are soon diluted with air until they are too lean to burn and,
therefore, the downstream range of the flammable concentrations will depend
on the extent of the spill, the fuel temperature, and the wind velocity.
This distance may be quite small but in all cases presents a hazard that
is not found with Jet A. Jet A can form flammable vapor air mixtures only
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•under the very -unlikely condition of the fuel temperature exceeding 125° F
(52° C). An added factor is that a pool of Jet B will continue to generate
a flammable mixture whereas the Jet A mist formed in a severe crash will
soon settle out and, therefore, constitutes only a transient hazard. Over-
all, Jet B is clearly more hazardous than Jet A as to the probability that
flammable mixtures will be carried to an ignition source. This is espe-
cially true in mild crashes where fuel may be spilled but not atomized.
The elapsed time between first flame in spilled fuel and the envelop-
ment of the fuselage can also be important to passenger survival. The
aircraft may come to rest on ground that becomes soaked with fuel while
the first flame is some distance away; any appreciable time delay may allow
passengers and crew to escape. The rate of flame spreading then becomes
most important and figure A-5 compares Jet A and.Jet B in this respect.
At a given temperature the spreading rate is always lower for Jet A and
is 20 to 30 times lower between UO° and 120° F (k° and kg0 C), the fuel
temperatures most likely to exist in a crash. Smaller bench scale experi-
ments show even greater differences in favor of Jet A (see appendix). A
very significant advantage rests with Jet A in this regard.
Finally,' there is the .question' as to the intensity of the fire once
it is well established. Here again, the preference must be for Jet A since
equal amounts of spilled fuel give larger flames with Jet B than with Jet A.
The radiant heat intensity is also greater with Jet B (see appendix).
In summary, the fire hazards after a survivable crash are clearly
greater with Jet B than with Jet A. Five factors were considered and Jet A
is either slightly or, significantly, the safer fuel for all five.
CONCLUSION
The only conclusion possible from this study is that Jet A is a safer
fuel than Jet B as far as fire hazards are concerned. This is for com-
mercial operation but reference 9 comes to the same conclusion in comparing
the flammable hazards of JP-8 (equivalent to Jet A) and JP-U (equivalent
to Jet B) for military operations. This unqualified conclusion can be
made because Jet A presents reduced flammable hazards under all conditions,
that is, in ground handling, in flight, and after survivable crashes. No
quantitative assessment of the relative hazards between Jet A and Jet B
appears possible for these various types of operation but none is needed
since the one fuel is preferable under all conditions.
This conclusion differs from that reached by references 1 and 2 where
both found that there should be no significant difference in the flammable
hazards of the two fuels. The reason for this difference in opinion is
this. Both references 1 and 2 rightly conclude that an analysis based on
equilibrium flammable considerations alone is not valid. But both cite
only the misting of Jet,A as an extension of the equilibrium hazards whereas
the leaning out of over-rich Jet B vapor mixtures by degassing and the in-
breathing of air and the stratification of vapor-air mixtures can also
11
extend flammable hazards 'beyond, those at equilibrium. Reference 7, writ-
ten since references 1 and 2, shows these latter nonequilibrium processes
to be long lived and we believe that these are much more important to air-
craft safety in closed tank situations than the misting process, (in open
air situations, the mist hazard is the same with both fuels and, therefore,
does not influence their relative ratings.) Otherwise and in all respects
we find Jet A to be the preferred fuel for commercial operations.
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APPENDIX - PROPERTIES OF JET FUELS
The specified and average values of the properties of the two types
of jet fuels considered in this report are given in table I. Only those
properties that may have some bearing on flammable hazards are listed.
There are many other specifications that relate to aircraft operations and
overall flight safety, (e.g., sulfur content, thermal stability, gum con-
tent, etc.) but these are.a measure of the trace impurities of fuels and
do not influence combustion properties. The freezing point, although not
related to combustion, is also listed in table I to point out that this
is the only specification difference between Jet A and Jet A-l; there is
an occasional misunderstanding in this regard. The Reid Vapor Pressure
is not specified and is not determined for Jet.A fuels since it is a num-
ber too small to be accurately measured by this test. Similarly, the
Flash Point is neither specified nor measured for Jet B fuels since it
would be well below room temperature where the test method is not appli-
cable. The specifications were taken from reference H. The average values
shown for the Jet A and Jet B fuels were taken from reference 5.
The kerosene type (Jet A) and the wide-cut (Jet B) are both derived
from the simple distillation of petroleum. Little, if any, cracked or
reformed stocks are used. The two types.of fuel differ primarily in their
distillation range, the wide-cut fuels having a much lower initial boiling
temperature and a slightly lower final boiling temperature than the kero-
sene types. The wide-cut fuels have the greater distillation range and
therefore can be obtained in greater yield from .the simple distillation of
crudes. This greater potential availability is the reason for the past
military.preference for JP-U. The bulk properties of petroleum fractions
are closely interrelated. Therefore, because of the differences in dis-
tillation, the wide-cut fuels (Jet B) have higher vapor pressures, lower
densities, lower viscosities, and lower molecular weights than the kero-
sene types.
Some combustion related properties can be estimated.from the values
listed in table A-l while others have either been directly determined for
similar fuels or can be reliably estimated from a general knowledge of
hydrocarbon combustion qualities. These properties are given in the fol-
lowing sections for the average kerosene type (Jet A) and the average
wide-cut (Jet B) fuels.
Vapor pressure. - Vapor pressures for these fuels were calculated
from distillation and flash point data for Jet A and from.distillation
and Reid Vapor Pressure data for Jet B using the methods of reference 6.
These are presented in figure A-l over the range of temperatures and pres-
sures of interest to aircraft operations. The Jet B has considerably
higher vapor pressures than Jet A over the operating temperature range„
Flammable limits. - Flames can be ignited and propagate only between
definite fuel-air concentration limits. For the vapors of jet fuels in
air, these limits are given in reference 6 as
= 1.8TX106 , }
L
 QM {A '
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and
R = L + =. (A-2)
M U < f
where
L lean flammable limit in percent "by volume of fuel in air
R rich flammable limit, also in percent by volume fuel in air
Q lower heat of combustion of fuel, Btu/lb
M molecular weight of fuel
The molecular weights and heats of combustion that should be used are those
of the vaporized portion of the fuel and not those of the whole fuel.
These molecular weights can be estimated from the 10 percent distillation
temperature (ref. 6, fig. 20). The heats of combustion of hydrocarbons
of these molecular weights can be estimated from standard thermodynamic
sources. The lean and rich limits as calculated from equations (A-l) and
(A-2) for the average Jet A and Jet B are listed below:
Jet A. Jet B
Lean limit, volume percent 0.7^  I.l6
Rich limit, volume percent 5.32 7.63
The flammable concentration limits listed above stay substantially the
same over the ranges of temperature and pressure encountered in flight.
This permits temperature - altitude envelopes to be calculated that define
the conditions that will yield flammable mixtures in the tank ullage space
under equilibrium conditions. These envelopes are presented in figure A-2
for the typical Jet A and Jet B. The fuel vapor-air system is flammable
within the boundaries shown. At lower temperatures, the ullage space will
be too lean to burn. At higher temperatures, it will be too rich.
The flammable envelope boundaries for a given type fuel as shown in
figure A-2 are not absolute limits. These boundaries can vary somewhat
with the method of calculation but considerably more with the quality of
the specific fuel sample that was used in the calculation. The boundaries
shown in figure A-2 are for an "average" Jet B having a Reid Vapor Pressure
of 2.6 psia (18 kN/m2) and an "average" Jet A .having a Flash Point of 129° F
(5^ ° C). The survey (ref. 5) that was used to compile these averages lists
individual samples of Jet B having RVP's ranging from 2.3 to 2.9 psia (l6
to 20 kN/m2) and individual samples of Jet A having Flash Points ranging
from 112° to 148° F (W to 6k° C). The result is that extreme samples
(but still well within specification values) of fuels can have lower and
upper flammable boundaries that are as much .as 20° F (11° C) higher or
lower than those shown in figure A-2.
There are nonequilibrium processes that extend the flammable region
to temperatures and altitudes (pressures) outside those shown in figure A-2,
These include mist and foam formation, the release of dissolved gases from
the fuel, and the inbreathing of air into the tank.
Finely divided fuel mists and foams in air are as flammable as vapor-
air systems and have substantially the same lean and rich limits in terms
of mass concentrations (ref. 8, p. 88). These two-phase systems can be
formed during refueling, during rapid reductions in.pressure (aircraft
climb), or by mechanical action as in turbulent flight. Under these con-
ditions , the flammable limits can be extended to lower temperatures for
both Jet A and Jet B than those shown in figure A-2.
The release of dissolved gases from the fuel as tank pressure is
lowered effectively lowers the percent of fuel in the ullage space and,
thereby extends the upper or rich limit to higher temperatures. The
released gas is also somewhat enriched in oxygen relative to air since
oxygen is more soluble in fuel than is nitrogen. This increases the hazard.
However, the effects of dissolved gas release are relatively small as shown
by data in reference 7 and the process is further discussed in reference !<>
A third nonequilibrium factor is the leaning out of the ullage space
in level flight by the air that enters through the vents as fuel is with-
drawn. Reference 7 gives data in this regard and shows that there are
zones in the ullage where fuel concentrations are only 15 to 50 percent of
their equilibrium value due to this process. Therefore, equilibrium rich
tanks are easily leaned down to a flammable condition during level flight
as air replaces the fuel consumed.
Finally, the inbreathing of air during descent will render too rich
mixtures temporarily flammable until equilibrium is re-established0 The
time that the mixture is not in equilibrium is a.function of.tank and vent
sizes and geometry, the rate of descent, the amount of tank vibration and
also depends on the type of fuel. Reference 7 shows substantial departures
from equilibrium for over 20 minutes with JP-U (Jet B) but much lesser
departures with Jet A. The reason for the difference between fuels is not
known (ref. 7). The data suggests that the over^-rich mixtures of Jet B
shown in figure A-2 are very easily leaned out to become flammable and
this significantly increases the hazard with this fuel.
The results of these several nonequilibrium processes are shown for
Jet A and Jet B in figure A-3. The overall conclusion is that flammable
conditions at equilibrium are most likely to be met with Jet B but that
both fuels can form flammable mixtures under nonequilibrium conditions over
all ranges of temperature and pressure that may be encountered in flight.
Ignition Temperatures and Energies
The minimum ignition temperature is the lowest surface temperature
that will ignite a fuel. Reference 8 (p. 106) shows that a kerosene (Jet A),
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a JP-k (Jet B), and two samples of JP-5 all have minimum ignition temper-
atures between ^ 73° and hQk° F (2^ 5° and 251° C). Therefore, there is no
significant difference between Jet A and Jet B in this regard.
The minimum spark energy needed to ignite many pure hydrocarbon-air
systems is about 0.2 millijoule (ref. 8, table XXXII). Reference 9
(table 2) gives the minimum spark energy as 0.20 millijoule for both Jet A
and JP-U (Jet B). These energies were determined for ideal concentrations
of fuel in air under ideal laboratory conditions; however, somewhat higher
energies are required to ignite practical fuel-air systems. Figure A-k
taken from reference 1*J- shows the energies needed to ignite sprays of Jet A
and Jet B as a function of temperature. The Flash Point temperatures, that
is, the minimum fuel temperatures needed to bring the fuel vapor pressures
up to a level where flammable mixtures are formed, are shown for both fuels
and the minimum ignition energy is about 6 millijoules for both at these
temperatures. At temperatures lower than the Flash Point, some of the
spark energy is required to help vaporize the fuel and, therefore, the
ignition energy increases with decreasing temperature as shown for Jet A.
At temperatures higher .than the Flash Point the fuel vapor pressure in-
creases .to form more nearly ideal flammable mixtures so that the spark
ignition energy decreases and approaches the value of 0.2. millijoule cited
in references 8 and 9; this is shown by the curve for Jet B.
The important conclusion to be drawn from figure A-4 is that, at a
given temperature, the minimum spark ignition energy for Jet A is about
10 times higher than for Jet B over the -temperatures encountered in air-
craft operations.
Finally, a comparison of JP-4 (Jet B) and kerosene (Jet A) as to the
ease of ignition by friction sparks showed the JP-U to be somewhat more
easily ignited (ref. 12). These sparks can be struck in crash situations
when metals are abraded on runway or other hard surfaces.
Flame Propagation and Spreading Rates
Flame speed, or the rate of laminar flame propagation in closed sys-
tems, is a fairly slow process and of the order of 1 foot (0.3 m) per
second for most hydrocarbons. It is substantially the same for JP-1
(Jet A) and JP-1* (Jet B) as shown in the appendix of reference 8. Turbu-
lent flame propagation and detonations are very much faster processes
but we know of no data directly comparing Jet A and Jet B in these com-
bustion processes. We believe that there should be no difference between
Jet A and Jet B as to any of the flame propagation processes in confined
areas provided the same weight concentrations of fuel in air are involved,,
The rate of flame spreading over the surface of liquid fuel in open
air is quite different and is very much a function of fuel vapor pressure.
Figure A-5 taken from reference 11 shows the flame spreading rate over
troughs of fuel in the open. The rate for JP-U (Jet B) is about 30 times
greater than for aviation kerosene (Jet A) at the temperatures most often
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encountered. Even greater differences are reported for bench scale experi-
ments in reference 10 where the spreading rate for JP-4 (Jet B) is given
as 7.3 feet (2.U m) per second and that for JP-8 (Jet A) is less than
0.01 foot (0.003 m) per second.
Energy Release Rates
In closed systems, this rate depends on the concentration of fuel, in
air in the ullage space, on pressure, and on temperature„ There should
be no significant differences between.Jet A and Jet B in this rate if these
factors are the same,,
Open systems, that is, spilled fuels in open air, are much more com-
plex and quantitative comparisons between Jet A and Jet B are more diffi-
cult. Much of the data available on fire intensity or energy release rates
have been developed through research on gelled or emulsified fuels„ These
thickened fuels have been proposed for the added safety they might confer
in survivable crash situations. The early use of such fuels is not likely
for commercial aviation and these are not discussed herein.
However, the programs on thickened fuels have reported.some data on
the relative fire intensity of unmodified wide-cut (Jet B) and kerosene
(Jet A) type fuels. Reference 13 gives the maximum flame height observed
when 2.6 pounds (1,2 kg) of fuel in a glass container was dropped onto
concrete next to a pilot flame. This height was 10 feet (3.1 m) for JP-k
(Jet B) and 3 feet (0.9 m) for JP-8 (Jet A). A similar experiment was
conducted and reported in reference 10 with 5 pounds (2.U kg) of fuel and
both the size of the fireball and.the maximum radiant intensity at 30 feet
distance was measured. The results are listed below for times less than
10 seconds after the drop.
JP-h (Jet B) JP-5
Max flame height, ft (m) 19 (5.8) 9.5 (2,9)
Max radiant intensity, w/ft2 500 hj
The JP-5 is not identical to Jet A but there is the clear conclusion that
the less volatile fuel has the lower rate of heat release in this type of
experiment. However, the fire will persist longer with the less volatile
fuel.
IT
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FIGURE l(a)
VERTICAL PROFILES OF FLAMMABLF. ZONES IN A SIMULATED
AIRCRAFT WING TANK DURING FULL LOADING
Fuel Flow Rate: 150 gprn Downward Inlet
Temperature; 70°F Fuel: Jet B
* Composition of vapors to vent shown at 30 in. level
Vent*
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FIGURE l(b)
FLAMMABLE ZONES IN A SIMULATED AIRCRAFT
WING TANK DURING FUEL LOADING
Jet A at 300 GPM, 85"F
(Downward inlet)
Nonflainmabit1. Zone
(Fuel Lean)
Liquid Fuel
Flammablfc Zone
Fuel Mist
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FIGURE A-4
MINIMUM SPARK IGNITION ENERGIES
FOR FUEL-AIR SPRAY MIXTURES
(reference 1)
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